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This paper explores the relationship between public sector efficiency (PSE) and the level of 
democracy, both theoretically and empirically. At the theoretical level a simple model of 
elections with two time periods is presented, which takes into account whether the political 
regime is democratic or not. Specifically, we assume that elected officials in democracies are 
“more” accountable to voters than the respective ones in autocracies. This mechanism induces 
the democratic politicians to produce the public good in a more efficient way, in order to remain 
in power. In the empirical section we examine the effect of democracy on PSE for a panel dataset 
of 50 developing and developed countries over the period 1980-2000. Our results suggest that 
the relationship between PSE and democracy is positive and statistically significant, thus 
confirming our theoretical priors.  
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1. Introduction 
Economic theory has revisited a question that was the sine qua non for both political science 
and philosophic research: are democratic institutions beneficial for human prosperity? A large 
literature has emerged which studies various aspects of this question. For example, Barro (1997) 
and De Haan and Siermann (1995) examine the effect of democracy on economic growth.
1 
Besley and Kundamatsu (2006) and Kundamatsu (2006) provide empirical evidence of strong 
and robust relationship between democracy and various socio-economic outcomes; and Mulligan 
et al. (2004) and Adam (2009) find cross country differences between economic policies enacted 
in democracies and autocracies. 
The analysis of the present paper augments the existing literature by examining an alternative 
channel through which democracy may affect economic outcomes. In particular, we focus on the 
potential role that the level of democracy plays in the production of public goods. To our 
knowledge this generates a novel hypothesis, suggesting that more democratic countries have a 
more efficient public sector (i.e. governments produce public goods more efficiently). This 
hypothesis is related to a recent body of research in political economy that considers the 
workings and efficiency of various political institutions, including political agencies and 
apparatuses (see e.g. Acemoglu, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2006; Besley and Persson, 2008). In this 
paper, we opt for both a theoretical and an empirical investigation of the nexus between public 
sector efficiency (PSE) and the level of democracy.  
In the theoretical section (Section 2) we extend a simple political agency model (e.g. Persson 
et al. 1997; Besley and Smart, 2007) by adding a reappointment rule, which takes into account 
whether the political regime is democratic or not. An inherent assumption in this mechanism is 
that elected officials in democracies are “more” accountable to voters than policy makers in 
                                                 
1 Przeworski and Limongi (1993) and Brunetti (1997) provide extensive surveys of this literature.   2
autocracies. The main result of this model is that democratic politicians must produce the public 
good in a more efficient way so as to remain in power.  
More precisely, the proposed model has the following features. A pure public good is 
produced by the elected politician who derives utility from the organizational slack of the 
production process. Here, slack is defined as the difference between the actual cost of producing 
the public good and the lowest possible cost. This is the standard notion of efficiency of the 
public sector as defined in the literature (Breton and Wintrobe, 1975; Prendergast, 2003; 
Mueller, 2003), and it has its roots on the managerial and behavioral theories of the firm (see e.g. 
Baumol, 1959; Cyert and March, 1963; Williamson, 1964). According to this view, the 
difference between the actual and the lowest possible cost of production is attributed to the 
purchase of non-productive resources by the bureaucrat. Subsequently, this allows for many 
types of non-productive spending that may include (but are not limited to) corruption or 
personnel expansion à la Williamson (1964). Since slack gives higher utility to the policy maker, 
he is willing to reduce the associated inefficiency only if his survival in office depends on his 
performance. In this framework, we show that even though public production is always 
inefficient, democratic institutions are able to restrain inefficiencies due to electoral control.
2  
Even though the theoretical model postulates a positive relationship between PSE and 
democracy, one may argue that in the real world there are examples of autocratic regimes that 
are not disastrous in economic terms.
3 For this reason we examine the empirical validity of our 
                                                 
2 In this respect, our paper is also related to a large number of papers that study the inefficiency of government 
bureaucracies. Miller and Moe (1983) and Bendor et al. (1985, 1987) show that even though political control 
decreases bureaucratic inefficiency, public bureaus may still operate inefficiently. Prendergast (2003) shows that 
government inefficiency depends on the way bureaucracies collect information. 
3 This is in accordance with the “stationary bandits” theory of dictatorship (McGuire and Olson, 1996), where a 
dictator expecting to stay in power for a long period of time has an incentive to promote economic development in 
order to increase his private consumption through higher tax revenues resulting from economic growth. In this 
essence one would also expect an autocratic leader to organize a well functioning public sector in order to 
expropriate the society for himself (we thank a referee for bringing our attention to this argument).   3
proposition in Sections 3 and 4. To measure public sector efficiency we use the dataset of 
Angelopoulos and Philippopoulos (2005), who construct measures of government efficiency for 
a total of 50 countries in 5-year intervals over the period 1980-2000. As a proxy for the level of 
democracy we employ three alternative measures: (i) the Gastil Index obtained from Freedom 
House (2004), (ii) the Polity IV (2004) index and (iii) the Przeworski et al. (2000) index. After 
several sensitivity analyses across a number of different specifications, the findings suggest that 
the relationship between the level of democracy and PSE is indeed positive and statistically 
significant, thus confirming our theoretical proposition.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model. 
In Section 3 we describe the data used in our empirical analysis and, and in Section 4 we present 
our main findings as well as an extensive discussion on the robustness of these results. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
The setup is a model of elections with two time periods. In each period the policy maker in 
office decides the amount of public good to be provided, the level of taxation and the level of 
resources that will be diverted from public to private use. The public good is produced at a 
constant cost per unit, c, which is observable by voters (also referred below as “the electorate”). 
At the end of the first period elections are held, in which voters choose between the incumbent 
and a challenger. The challenger in drawn randomly from the electorate before the elections and, 
if elected, he has the same utility function and ability as the incumbent. Voters derive utility from 
the consumption of a private and a public good, whereas the policy maker derives utility from 
the amount of slack extracted from the public budget.   4
Our model builds on Besley and Smart (2007) and Besley (2006). The two main differences 
are that (i) in our model the cost of producing the public good is observable by the voters
4 and 
(ii) that we include a reappointment mechanism which takes into account whether the political 
regime is democratic or not (as in Rosendorff, 2001; Mansfield, et al., 2002). The “degree” of 
democracy in a country determines whether the electoral outcome is binding for the future of the 
policy maker. In the case of a perfect democratic regime, the electoral outcome is compulsory for 
the policy maker and, therefore, remaining in office is exclusively dependent on voters’ decision. 
On the other hand, in political regimes deviating from pure democracy, incumbent survival in 
office depends to a variable degree on exogenous factors besides elections (the lower the level of 
democracy the larger the impact of these exogenous factors). This mechanism allows us to study 
how alternative political regimes affect the agency relationship between citizens and politicians.  
The sequence of events is as follows. At the start of the first period voters announce and 
commit to a voting rule. Next, the policy maker decides the amount of public good and the level 
of taxation in the first period by taking into account the announced election rule and the 
government budget constraint. At the end of the first period elections take place. Voters observe 
their first period utility and, based on the voting rule, decide whether to reappoint the policy 
maker or not. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Since voters have full information about the cost of producing the public good, they can also observe the amount of 
resources diverted by the politician. In this line of models, the rents of the policy maker are present owing to the fact 
that the politician stays in office at least for one period and are usually referred to as “rents from power between 
elections” (Persson et al., 1997). Here, the role of voting is purely to achieve some level of discipline, thus 
rewarding those politicians who extract lower rents. Previous work on political accountability assumes that there is 
asymmetric information between voters and politicians that leads either to moral hazard problems (Barro, 1973; 
Ferejohn, 1986), adverse selection (Besley and Prat, 2006), or both (Persson et al., 1997; Fearon, 1999; Besley and 
Smart, 2007). Since our basic insight can be given in a simple perfect information model, we ignore the issue of 
information asymmetries. We have verified, however, that our main result carries through even in a model with 
asymmetric information. For another political agency model with perfect information, see Przeworski (2003).   5
2.1. Voters 









= ∑                              ( 1 )  
where parameter δ∈(0,1)  is the discount factor.  () tt t uw H G τ = −+  is the per period utility 
function with w the (exogenous) private income, τt the taxes paid by the voter, Gt the amount of 
the public good and H(.) a concave function that increases monotonically in Gt. 
 
2.2. The policy maker 











= ∑                    (2) 
where St is the per period utility function of the politician. More intuitively, we assume that St is 
the amount of public resources that the politician diverts from the government budget to his own 
welfare. Given this mechanism, the government budget constraint is of the following form: 
ttt cG S τ +=                          ( 3 )  
where τt is total tax revenue and c is the unit cost of producing the public good. Even though St is 
typically considered to be rent extraction of public resources for private use of the politician (see 
e.g. Besley and Smart, 2007; Besley, 2006), it can also be interpreted more generally as any type 
of waste in the production process of the public good that creates a wedge between the real and 
the minimum feasible cost of producing Gt. Under this interpretation it may seem rather arbitrary 
to include St in the utility of the policy maker. However, this decision is justified by assuming   6
that the role of the elected official is to monitor (through costly effort) the production of the 
public good by a public bureau (Makris, 2006). Then, if the objective of the public bureau is to 
maximize its own organizational slack (which is also St as in Wyckoff, 1990) and this slack is a 
decreasing function of the effort of the policy maker, it seems straightforward to assume that the 
utility of the policy maker will be monotonically increasing in St.  Therefore, St can be defined as 
the level of inefficiency/organizational slack of the public sector (see e.g. Wyckoff, 1990; 
Mueller, 2003). Examples of such waste include, but may not be limited to, the use of inefficient 
technology, excess labor and/or payment of inefficiently high wages to civil servants.   
 
2.3. Elections and political regime  
At the start of the first period voters announce and commit to an election rule prior to the 
incumbent’s first fiscal policy choice. Since the voters are assumed to be identical, they always 
have the same voting strategy in equilibrium and, thus, there is no coordination problem in their 
voting strategies. Voters’ reason is as follows. Since the policy maker can always extract the 
maximum St in the first period and forego re-election, he must be offered an incentive that 
prevents him from doing so. Then, if  {0,1} Φ = is the probability of voting for the incumbent, the 
voters’ strategy may be expressed as:  
1 1            if 
0           otherwise
u ε ≥ ⎧
Φ=⎨
⎩
                        ( 4 )  
where ε is the (optimally chosen) threshold utility level, above which the electorate votes for the 
incumbent. In turn, on the basis of the government budget constraint (3) and the voters’ strategy 
(4), the policy maker decides on the level of τ1 and G1 in order to maximize utility function (2).    7
When elections take place the voters observe their first period utility and, given their strategy 
(4), they decide whether to re-elect the policy maker. Finally, in the second period the policy 
maker decides τ2 and G2 so as to maximize the same utility function (2). 
We assume that elections occur in all types of political regimes. However, depending on the 
“degree” of democracy, the electoral outcome is binding for the survival of the policy maker.  
The more democratic a country, the more important are the elections in determining the 
reappointment of the incumbent. In the case of a perfectly democratic regime, the electoral 
outcome is compulsory for the policy maker and, therefore, remaining in office is exclusively 
dependent on voters’ decision. In contrast, the electorate’s will is not fully obligatory in political 
regimes deviating from pure democracy. This by no means implies that in autocracies the 
executive remains in office indefinitely. Coups by the opposition, intra-party elections and 
revolutions are all mechanisms through which autocratic rulers lose office.
5 However, the crucial 
element in autocratic regimes is that these processes are irrelevant to the electoral outcome, as 
the nature of these regimes allows the policy maker to remain in office even in the disinclination 
of the majority.  
Following Mansfield et al. (2002) and Rosendorff (2004), we characterize the political 
regime type by a scalar measure  [ ] 0,1 σ ∈ , where σ=1 (resp. σ=0) defines a fully democratic 
(resp. autocratic) regime. Then, the probability ρ that the incumbent stays in office is: 
(1 ) ρ σσ =Φ + −                             ( 5 )    
                                                 
5 Although we acknowledge the existence of these forces, it is understandable that autocratic rulers can be replaced 
at a higher cost than the democratically elected politicians. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the cost of 
replacement of the autocratic ruler is infinite, i.e. autocratic rulers cannot be replaced. In fact, the model can be 
easily extended to allow for a finite probability of replacement of the autocratic rulers. Even in this case however, 
the qualitative nature of our results remains unchanged. 
   8
This equation implies that in the extreme case of pure autocracy (i.e. σ=0) the policy maker 
remains in office irrespectively of the will of the electorate,
6 whereas in the case of a perfect 
democratic regime the electoral outcome is strictly binding. However, in autocratic regimes that 
do not fall into the extreme case there is a probability (1-ρ) that the official will be evicted, and 
this likelihood increases with a favorable electoral outcome. 
 
2.4. Equilibrium 
The above political structure implies that the optimally chosen ε is given by the following 
equation (see Appendix A for a formal derivation): 
1 (( ) ) G wH H c εσ δ
− =+                         ( 6 )  
The (sub-game perfect) equilibrium in this economy is defined as follows: Given the re-election 
rule (4), the survival probability for the incumbent (5) and the threshold utility of the voters ε (6), 
a sub-game perfect equilibrium is defined by the policy strategies in both periods (τ1, τ2, G1, G2,) 
such that the incumbent cannot increase his utility by deviating. Equilibrium is characterized by 
equations (6)-(11) (see Appendix A for more details on the derivation of these equations).  
1
1 () G GHc
− =                          ( 7 )  
1
1 (1 ) ( ) G wc H c τσ δ
− =− −                         ( 8 )  
1 (1 ) Sw σδ =−                          ( 9 )  
2 0 G =                       ( 1 0 )  
2 w τ =                       ( 1 1 )  
                                                 
6 Following the discussion of the previous paragraph, we can augment equation (5) by multiplying the second term 
on the right hand side by a probability that the autocratic ruler remains in office. If this probability is exogenous or 
less sensitive to changes in “voters” welfare than the electoral rule (implying that the cost of replacing the policy 
maker by non- electoral means is higher), our results remain qualitatively the same.       9
2 Sw =                       ( 1 2 )  
Having derived the equilibrium equations, let us comment on the intuition behind the above 
results. Since voters have full information about c, they can observe the amount of St that the 
policy maker extracts. Yet, the policy maker has the advantage of being responsible (and 
accountable) for making policy decisions and diverting rents at least for one period. This is 
exactly what Persson et al. (1997) define as “rents from power”. Phrased differently, the 
incumbent is allowed to extract a positive amount of S1; however, beyond a certain threshold of 
resource extraction the voters can discipline the incumbent during the first period, by forcing him 
out of office through their electoral will. If this were not the case, he would prefer to extract the 
maximum amount of rents in the first period and not get re-elected.     
In this setting, σ represents the “power’ of voters over the incumbent. In a low σ political 
environment (corresponding to autocratic regimes), the will of the electorate is not binding for 
the survival of the incumbent in office and the electorate is not able to enforce a low amount of 
S1. In contrast, within a high σ environment (corresponding to a democratic regime), the 
reappointment of the incumbent depends highly on the electoral outcome. Hence, voters 
determine the fate of the incumbent by their choice on the voting rule. In general, an increasing σ 
is aligned with higher power of the electorate, an associated increase in the discipline of the 
policy maker and a reduction in S1. 
Since the voting rule is expressed in terms of a threshold level of utility, the policy maker 
chooses the values of G1 and τ1 so as to achieve the maximum level of rent extraction and satisfy 
the re-election constraint (4). With the quasi-linear voters’ utility function, this is achieved at the 
particular level of public good that equates the marginal cost of producing it with the marginal 
utility obtained from G1 (i.e. the public good is supplied at the optimal level). On the other hand,   10
τ1 is inefficiently high (see equation (8)). Finally, in the second period elections are not held and, 
as such, it is expected that the policy maker will always extract the maximum amount of rents, 
i.e. w. 
The above can be summarized by the following proposition,
7 which derives the main 
theoretical result of the present paper, as well as the testable hypothesis of the empirical section 
that follows.      
 
Testable Hypothesis: Public sector inefficiency, as measured by the difference between the real 
and the minimum feasible cost of producing the public good, falls when the level of the electoral 







= −< . 
 
3. Data 
Our dataset consists of 50 developing and developed countries and covers the period 1980-
2000. The dependent variable is the Public Sector Efficiency index (hereafter PSE) constructed 
by Angelopoulos and Philippopoulos (2005) on the basis of the methodology developed by 
Afonso et al. (2005). The basic objective of this PSE measure is to compare the performance of 
different national governments in certain areas of economic activity with the associated public 
spending that the government allocates in order to achieve this particular performance.  
Angelopoulos and Philippopoulos (2005) construct six alternative PSE indicators using 
associated expenditure (input) and performance (output) measures. More precisely they construct 
(i) a public administration efficiency index (denoted as PSEadm), (ii) a public infrastructure 
efficiency index (denoted as PSEinfr), (iii) a public education efficiency index (PSEedu), two 
                                                 
7 Note that the comparative static presents the effect of a change in σ on S1, i.e. the inefficiency in the first period. 
However, as S2 is always equal to w, this result is equivalent to the effect of σ on the sum of S1 and S2.     11
general indicators of government efficiency in targets related to (iv) economic stabilization 
(denoted as PSEstab) and (v) general economic performance (denoted PSEperf). The sixth index, 
which is the focal dependent variable employed in our empirical analysis, emerges as the average 
of the five sub-indices given above.
8 For more details on the alternative performance and 
expenditure measures associated with these PSE indices see, Appendix B. 
As a proxy for the level of democracy we use three alternative measures: (i) the Gastil 
democracy index taken from Freedom House (2004) (denoted as Democracy), (ii) the Polity 
democracy index taken from the Polity IV (2004) database (denoted as Democracy Polity) and 
(iii) the Przeworski democracy index taken from Przeworski et al. (2000) (denoted as Democracy 
Przeworski). The Gastil index is formed on the basis of ideals about political rights and civil 
liberties, and countries closer to these ideals receive a lower rating.
9 In particular, the Gastil 
index consists of two components, namely a civil liberties index and a political rights index, each 
ranging from 1 to 7. Even though these two indices are highly correlated, each one provides 
different information about the type of the political regime (see e.g. Adam and Filippaios, 2007). 
In order to construct a single, general measure of democracy we follow Helliwell (1994) and 
define  (14 ) /12 Democracy Political Civil =− − , where Political and Civil are the political rights 
                                                 
8 The performance and the expenditure measures are expressed in different units of measurement. To make the 
values comparable across countries we express each country’s performance and expenditure indices relative to the 
average performance and expenditure of all countries in each period (and this is done for all periods and for all 
indices). In other words, each country’s measures are expressed as percentages of the respective average 
(normalized to be 100), and in turn PSE is obtained as the ratio of the relative values. Thus, the resulting index 
computes the efficiency of a country relative to the other countries in the sample, in each period in a particular 
policy area. A lower PSE implies that a given level of G is produced at a relatively higher cost (i.e. at a cost higher 
than the lowest possible). This is the same definition of efficiency as in the theoretical section. 
9 According to Gastil (1982), the political liberties ideals involve the “[…] rights to participate meaningfully in the 
political process. In a democracy this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for 
elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies” (Gastil, 1982, p.7). Civil liberties ideals involve a 
series of various economic, political and civil liberties enjoyed by the citizens of the country, such as Freedom of 
Expression and Belief, Association and Organization Rights, Rule of Law and Personal Autonomy and Economic 
Rights. Again in the words of Gastil “Civil liberties are rights to free expression, to organize or demonstrate, as well 
as rights to a degree of autonomy such as is provided by freedom of religion, education, travel, and other personal 
rights” (Gastil, 1982, p.7)   12
and civil liberties sub-indices, respectively. After this modification, the Democracy variable 
obtains values from 0 to 1, with higher values reflecting more democratic regimes. 
The Polity index focuses on the institutional structure of the political regimes. The variable 
Democracy Polity is the difference between the two sub-indices of Democracy and Autocracy, as 
provided by Polity IV, and obtains values from -10 to 10. A score of Democracy Polity equal to -
10 (+10) indicates a strongly autocratic (democratic) state. According to Polity IV, a democratic 
polity has three essential characteristics. First, the political participation is fully competitive; 
second, institutionalized constraints on executive power are present; and third, civil liberties are 
secured. In contrast, absence of these three characteristics typifies an autocratic country. The 
difference between the Democracy Polity and Democracy indices is that the latter places more 
emphasis on the political and civil liberties and, therefore, it defines democracy in a rather non-
minimalist way. 
Finally, the Przeworski et al. (2000) index is a dichotomous variable, which takes the value 
of 0 when the regime is classified as democracy and 1 otherwise. More intuitively, Przeworski et 
al., following Schumpeter (1947), define democracy as the regime in which incumbents lose 
elections and leave office if they do. Hence, this measure (in contrast to the Gastil and Polity IV 
indices) follows a simple objective criterion on the basis of classification-alternation in power 
following elections.           
As in every empirical study, it is natural to assume that electoral accountability is not 
exclusively dependent on the level of democracy. Different ways of delegating powers, as well 
as different electoral rules may also be important determinants of the officials’ accountability 
(see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2003). A number of theoretical studies address the issue of how 
electoral rules affect political rents (Myerson, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Persson et al.,   13
2003). In presidential systems, for example, the separation of powers is greater, the policy maker 
is more directly accountable to voters and coalition governments are not an issue. On these 
grounds, presidential regimes create a direct link between individual performance and re-
appointment. Then, elected officials have strong incentives to perform well in office and, in 
accordance to our theoretical framework, this may lead to lower PSE. As regards the electoral 
rules, and given that the electoral outcome is generally more sensitive to the incumbent’s 
performance in majoritarian-type elections, the general prediction is that such elections are more 
effective in promoting better performance of the policy maker.   
To capture these forms of heterogeneity among democracies we include two additional 
control (dummy) variables in our estimated equations, namely proportional (which takes the 
value of 1 when the electoral system is considered to be proportional and zero otherwise) and 
presidential (which takes the value of 1 in presidential systems and 0 in parliamentary) . Both 
variables are obtained from Beck et al. (2001). 
In the estimated equation, we also include a measure of income inequality. According to 
Acemoglu et al. (2006), an inefficient government structure in the phase of democratization is 
the outcome of a political exchange between the rich elite and the bureaucrats of the country, so 
that the rich will remain in power and avoid redistribution. Based on this reasoning, higher 
income inequality implies a more redistributive democracy and, thus, greater incentives for the 
rich to set up an inefficient bureaucracy in order to keep the poor away from power (i.e. a 
negative relationship between inequality and PSE). Income inequality (Ineq) is proxied by the 
Theil index, which consists of estimated household income inequality and is obtained from the 
University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) database. The advantage of the UTIP dataset is 
that the inequality data are comparable both across countries and through time.    14
Another element that may be an essential control in our proposed empirical framework is the 
degree of military involvement in the political process.  Even though all non-democratic regimes 
may easily resort to violence in order to remain in power, military regimes typically have an 
“expertise advantage” in the use of military power. Hence, military regimes present a higher 
probability of survival when economic outcomes are poor and, consequently, military is expected 
to be negatively correlated with PSE. To this end, we introduce the dummy variable military 
(taken from Beck et. al., 2001) in our empirical model, which equals to one when the chief 
executive of the government is a military officer.  
Besides the measures capturing the political conditions, we also include various other 
macroeconomic control variables in our estimated equations. First, we consider the effect of the 
international trade volume (openness), measured as exports plus imports over GDP (taken from 
the Penn World Tables, 2000). The higher is the exposure to international trade, the stronger the 
international competition for foreign direct investment and high-skilled labor. Given that rising 
international competition increases the need for an efficient public sector (Chan, 2002), openness 
is expected to be positively associated with PSE. Furthermore, GDP per capita (denoted as 
GDPcap) is used as a proxy for the technology of producing the public good and is also expected 
to be positively associated with PSE. Finally, in order to capture the effect of a larger public 
sector on PSE, we use government spending as a share of GDP (denoted as gov), which is 
obtained from the Penn World Tables (2000).  
  Finally, the analysis includes a dummy variable (denoted as IMF) that equals to one 
whenever a country is under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program (agreement).
10 As 
                                                 
10 There are four main types of IMF programs, namely the stand-by arrangement, the extended fund facility, the 
structural adjustment facility and the enhanced structural adjustment facility. As Polak (1991) notes, these 
arrangements differ in the size, conditions and timing of the loans, but their fundamental objectives do not differ.   15
IMF programs impose fiscal austerity, it is expected that they result in lower government deficits 
and increased efficiency. Furthermore, in order to capture the policy restrictions imposed when 
central banks are independent, we utilize the Cukierman et al. (1992) index of central bank 
independence (denoted as CBI) as updated by Polillo and Guillén (2005). Higher CBI may imply 
limited ability for monetary financing of budget deficits, and thus higher PSE. 
All variables are taken as 5-year averages so as to account for short-term variations in the 
macro data. Ideally we would end up with 200 observations; however, missing data for some 
countries in certain time periods leaves us with 130 observations. Seeing that the dataset for 
many countries consists of only one observation we cannot estimate the model with fixed 
country effects.
11 Therefore, we assume that only fixed time effects are present. Still, cross 
country heterogeneity could be a source of misspecification in our empirical model and for this 
reason we introduce a number of dummy variables corresponding to the geographic location of 
the countries (SE Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa,  Latin America), as well as a dummy for the 
economies in transition (denoted Transition Economies).
12 Finally, to tackle the potential 
problem of heteroskedasticity, we estimate the model with robust standard errors.  
To this end, the following equation is being estimated:  
12 3 4 5 6
78 9 1 0          
it it it it it it it
it it it it ijt t
PSE Democracy GDPcap gov openness IMF CBI
proportional presidential milatary ineq D
ββ β β β β
β ββ β γ λ
=+ + + + +
++ + + + +
            (13) 
Where λt is the fixed time effects and Djit is the vector of the (continent) dummy variables.  
 
4. Empirical results 
                                                                                                                                                             
Thus, we only consider whether a country is under an agreement, without differentiating among the different types 
of agreements.    
11 If we used the within estimator, countries with a single observation would have been dropped. On the other hand, 
if we estimate the model with the least squares dummy variables method, we would have a great loss in degrees of 
freedom as we would need 50 dummies to account for the country effects.  
12 In the sensitivity analysis of the following section we also introduce “continent dummies”.   16
4.1. Basic results  
In Table 1 we present the results with the overall level of PSE being the dependent variable. 
The results in columns (1) to (8) suggest that Democracy is a positive and significant 
determinant of PSE at the 1 per cent level of statistical significance. Obviously, this implies that 
the level of democracy and PSE are positively related and our main theoretical proposition is 
verified. This relationship is robust across all alternative specifications and remains unaffected 
even when we use the alternative indices Democracy polity and Democracy Przeworski (see 
columns 2, 3, 6 and 7).  
Concerning the rest of the explanatory variables the results are as follows. The coefficient on 
GDPcap is positive and highly significant in all alternative specifications, whereas the 
coefficient on gov is negative and significant in most cases. Furthermore, in columns (3) through 
(6) military enters the regressions with a negative sign and remains highly significant across the 
different specifications, verifying our priors about the impact of military involvement in politics 
on  PSE. Considering the effect of income inequality, Ineq turns out to be negative and 
statistically significant in all specifications, implying that more unequal societies have more 
inefficient governments. This result is in accordance to the theoretical priors of Acemoglu et. al 
(2006) described in the previous section. 
In contrast, the impact of electoral rules as captured by the variables proportional and 
presidential appears to be insignificant. The absence of a significant effect of proportional may 
be attributed to the fact that typical proportional electoral systems combine large electoral 
districts and party list ballots. Notably, the former are considered to increase the policy maker’s 
incentives for good performance, while the latter are thought to have the exact opposite effect 
(see Persson et al., 2003). On the other hand, the insignificant (and negative effect) of   17
presidential appears to be puzzling at a first glance. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
presidential systems are usually established in younger democracies (see Persson and Tabellini, 
2003), where formal rules of accountability are less important. To explore the possibility that this 
mechanism drives our results, we additionally include in the estimation presented in column (8) 
an interaction term of presidential with the age of democracy (taken from Persson and Tabellini, 
2003).
13 This interaction term (denoted as presidential_age) shows that the effect of presidential 
on PSE is positive and significant once we consider older democracies and negative otherwise.    
Finally, the CBI dummy is insignificant, whereas the IMF dummy bears a negative sign and 
is significant or marginally significant in most of the estimated equations.
14  
 
4.2. Decomposing PSE 
In Table 2 we present the results of the regressions of the five sub-indices of PSE on a core 
set of explanatory variables.
15 Democracy obtains a positive and significant coefficient in the 
PSEadm and PSEperf equations, whereas it appears to be negatively associated only with 
PSEedu.
16 PSEadm is a variable of special interest for this analysis since it measures stricto 
sensu the efficiency of public administration. Thus, the positive and highly significant coefficient 
of  Democracy  on  PSEadm validates our theoretical proposition that increased electoral 
                                                 
13 The variable age is defined as the ratio of the number of years a country has been a democracy (from the year 
2000 backwards) over the number 200.    
14 The negative sign on the IMF dummy appears to be puzzling. It can be argued, however, that only countries 
facing great public sector inefficiencies will get themselves into an agreement with the IMF in the first place. 
Therefore, selectivity bias may be responsible for rendering our results unreliable. For this reason we re-estimated 
the above model with Heckman’s method (Heckman, 1976, 1988). The variables used to explain the decision of a 
country to enter into an IMF agreement are those of Przeworski and Vreeland (2000). However, the estimated 
correlation coefficient (ρ) between the residuals of the equation that explains the decision to enter into an IMF 
agreement and the residuals of the equation that explains PSE was found to be insignificant (the LR test does not 
reject the null of no correlation among the residuals). Therefore, we cannot statistically reject the model of Table 1 
on these grounds. Moreover, we noted that the signs and the statistical significance of the rest of the variables do not 
change when the Heckman model is used.  
15 The core set of explanatory variables corresponds to the equation presented in column (5) of Table 1. 
16 In the PSEinfr and PSEstab equations democracy enters with a positive sign, but appears to be marginally 
insignificant.   18
accountability leads to better performance of the policy maker and, consequently, to higher 
efficiency scores. On the other hand, the coefficient on Democracy in the PSEedu equation bears 
a negative sign and appears to be marginally significant.
17  
Concerning the rest of the explanatory variables, the results are quite similar to those 
reported in Table 1. Again, coefficients on GDPcap and gov are positive and significant in most 
of the alternative specifications, whereas military and IMF bear negative and significant signs. 
An interesting, yet puzzling result is the negative and significant coefficient of openness on 
PSEadm and PSEinfr. Although this result is at odds with typical theoretical predictions, which 
claim that increased exposition to international markets improves public sector efficiency, it is 
aligned with recent empirical studies (see e.g. Angelopoulos, 2005).  
 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
As the sample of the 50 countries is quite heterogeneous in many aspects, we examine here 
the robustness of the results presented above by checking whether they are driven by individual 
outliers or by groups of countries. To account for the first issue, we re-estimate our benchmark 
model this time excluding all observations with an error term in the upper or lower 5th percentile 
(thus, we dropped 10 percent of our sample). The results, presented in the first column of Table 
3, remain qualitatively unaffected and the only difference is the higher fit of the equation (higher 
R-squared values).In particular, the coefficient on Democracy is once again found to be positive 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that the performance measure employed to construct the PSEedu index is the secondary school 
enrolment ratio, which measures the total number of pupils enrolled in the secondary education. Obviously, this 
performance measure fails to capture quality characteristics of the educational systems. Therefore, PSEedu does not 
place the spotlight on potential differences in the quality of different educational systems (pupil per teacher e.t.c.) 
and possibly gives an unfair advantage to massive educational systems that solely achieve “economies of scale”. 
Certainly, this places serious doubts on the validity of our results in the PSEedu equation, since there is a general 
consensus that differences in public spending in education across countries are associated with the quality of the 
education system (see Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009).   19
and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, while the impact of the rest of the control 
variables remains unaltered.  
The issue of heterogeneous groups of countries has been (partially) addressed by including 
the four dummies SE Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Transition Economies in the 
estimated equations. In this section we examine whether the results above are significantly 
affected when we exclude each of these groups in turn. In columns (2) to (5) we report the results 
after excluding from the sample Transition Economies, Latin American countries, Sub-Saharan 
African countries and SE Asian countries, respectively. Notably, in all cases the coefficient on 
Democracy remains positive and highly significant. Although there are noteworthy changes in 
the magnitude of the respective coefficients across the different specifications (for example when 
we exclude the SE Asian countries the coefficient on Democracy is minimized and equals to 
0.59), its statistical significance remains clearly unaffected. Moreover, our findings concerning 
the rest of the explanatory variables also remain practically unchanged. In column (6) we 
additionally include three continent dummies in the estimated equations, namely Europe, 
America and Asia. Even though these dummies do not substitute for country effects, we feel 
confident that they capture a significant degree of heterogeneity. The results concerning the key 
variables of the present study remain virtually the same as before.  
Another potential drawback of our empirical analysis is the possible endogeneity between 
Democracy and PSE. We re-estimate our basic model using an instrumental variables method, 
where  Democracy is instrumented on an index of the Freedom of the Legal System and 
Protection of the Property Rights (obtained from Gwartney and Lawson, 2006). The instrumental 
variable presents strong explanatory power in the first stage regression, with an F-test equal to 
75.94. Moreover, the instrument is weakly correlated with PSE (the correlation coefficient is less   20
than 0.1). The results of the instrumental variables regression are given in column (7). Much like 
the rest of the equations, Democracy enters with a positive sign and is significant at the 1 per 
cent level. In addition, note that the Hausman test does not reject, at any level of significance, the 
hypothesis that the difference between the IV and the OLS model is not systematic. 
To further examine the effect of outliers we exclude from our sample the bona fide 
autocracies as indicated in the Przeworski et al. (2000) measure (i.e. all observations where this 
index takes the value of one, corresponding to an institutionalized autocracy). Yet again, the 
results presented in column (8) suggest that impact of Democracy remains positive and 
significant. 
A further sensitivity analysis of our results involves re-estimation of our basic model with the 
share of public to private sector efficiency (denoted as relative PSE) as the dependent variable, 
so as to account for the efficiency level of the private sector of the examined economies. Our 
theoretical priors suggest that the electoral control provided by Democracy is the driving force 
that limits the inefficiency of the public sector. However, to provide a consistent empirical 
validation of the theoretical model, we should establish that Democracy does not have a similar 
effect on the private sector of the economy. Otherwise, the positive link between efficiency and 
democracy may be attributed to institutional or other factors that influence the efficiency of the 
private sector in similar ways. To proxy the efficiency of the private sector we construct a 
measure using the same technique with that used for the public sector. Three factors of 
production, namely physical capital, labor and human capital serve as inputs and real GDP serves 
as the output. Physical capital is computed on an annual basis as the sum of investment and non-
depreciated capital from the previous year, assuming a 10% depreciation rate per year. Labor is 
given by the total workforce. To construct both these measures (as well as real GDP) we used   21
data from the Penn World Tables (2000). Human capital is proxied by the literacy rate, taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. If democracy has a differential effect on 
the efficiency of the public sector (compared to the private sector), one would expect a positive 
link between Democracy and relative PSE. The results presented in Table 4, column 3, suggest 
that this is indeed the case.  
As a final exercise we re-estimate our model for two different sub-samples, corresponding to 
democratic and autocratic countries. We carry out this analysis in order to examine whether our 
empirical results are driven by the presence of an outlier group of autocracies, where there is no 
uncertainty about holding office. Following the paradigm of Islam and Winer (2004), we define a 
country as institutionized democracy (autocracy) when the combined Gastil index of civil and 
political liberties is less than or equal to (greater than) 4. The results are reported in the first three 
columns of Table 5. Again, Democracy remains positive and significant and there is no 
considerable change in the value of the associated coefficient.   
In the final three columns of Table 5 we add the variable internal_conf (taken from ICRG, 
2000), which provides an overall assessment of violence in a country owing to civil war, 
terrorism and/or civil disorder. In autocratic regimes the threat of a violent coup or revolution 
may provide an effective mechanism of control, which may eventually substitute the effects of 
electoral control. If this holds, one should expect that the inclusion of internal_conf will affect 
the sign and statistical significance of Democracy, at least for the group of countries labeled as 
autocracies. However, the results presented in columns 4-6 show that this is not the case. 
Democracy retains its statistical significance and the magnitude of the coefficient does not 
change, while internal_conf is insignificant in all cases. 
   22
6.  Conclusion 
In this article we embarked on a detailed examination of the nexus between public sector 
efficiency and a polity’s level of democracy. To the best of our knowledge this paper signifies 
the first attempt to directly link PSE with democracy. The positive relationship identified point – 
we believe – to a new research agenda on how PSE affects various areas of economic 
performance. This agenda may simply examine the interrelationship between the efficiency of 
public spending, growth and economic volatility, but the analysis may well go beyond this 
curtain to fundamental themes in the history of political economy. That is the interest may lie in 
the creation of a system where the wellbeing of the administrative machine does not oppose but 
rather identifies with economic development; or where state intervention, in close collaboration 
with private initiative, tries to benefit from the important opportunities offered by the 
international distribution of labor and by modern technologies. The further progress of such 
theoretical and empirical studies should significantly improve our understanding of the 
challenges faced in governing the public sectors, as well as the overall process of economic 
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Table 1  
Democracy and PSE 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Democracy  1.147***     1.360*** 1.116***     1.282*** 
  (6.272)     (4.921) (3.228)     (2.838)       
Democracy  polity   0.035***     0.046***    
   (2.708)     (2.732)    
Democracy  Przeworski    -0.349***    -0.213*   
    (-3.387)     (-1.717)         
GDPcap  0.448*** 0.545*** 0.481*** 0.597*** 0.543*** 0.539*** 0.400**    0.621*** 
  (3.600) (4.218) (6.305) (3.879) (3.129)  (3.353)  (3.212)     (3.099)    
gov  -0.016** -0.016*  -0.019*** -0.027*** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** 
  (-2.329) (-1.871) (-4.048) (-3.882) (-2.115) (-2.126) (-2.072)        (-2.093)     
openness  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002     -0.002    
  (0.217)  (0.310)  (-0.340) (-1.022) (-1.592) (-1.583) (-1.519)        (-1.567)     
IMF        -0.454*** -0.339*** -0.228*  -0.208     -0.493***
        (-3.435) (-2.824) (-1.770) (-1.463)        (-3.246)     
CBI        -0.157  0.093  0.081  0.262     0.134    
        (-0.488)  (0.239)  (0.210)  (0.689)     (0.315)    
proportional      0.090  0.089  0.075        0.185** 
          (0.983)  (0.950)  (0.752)     (1.962)    
presidential          -0.171  -0.166  -0.219     -0.439** 
      (-1.264)  (-1.239)  (-1.540)        (-2.193)     
presidential_age         0.442** 
         (2.040)       
military      -0.590*** -0.593***  -0.436**  -0.545       
      (-3.290)  (-3.316)  (-2.418)        (-1.536)     
Ineq      -0.026**  -0.026**  -0.035**    -0.007       
      (-1.976)  (-1.972)  (-2.780)        (-0.435)     
latin  0.519*  0.538*** 0.119  0.368**  0.572*** 0.575*** 0.551*** 0.712*** 
  (1.870) (3.010) (1.071) (2.307) (2.936)  (2.974)  (2.799)     (3.124)    
seasia  1.098*** 1.063*** 0.968*** 1.230*** 1.406*** 1.406*** 1.390*** 1.658*** 
  (4.441) (4.636) (7.069) (5.077) (5.098)  (5.119)  (4.763)     (5.479)    
saharan  -0.003  0.010  0.077  0.152  0.262  0.267  0.284     0.271    
  (-0.026)  (0.027)  (0.356)  (0.805)  (1.073)  (1.060)  (1.034)     (0.907)    
transition  -0.305*** -0.311  -0.372*** -0.085  -0.195  -0.189  -0.329     0.209    
  (-3.904) (-1.297) (-2.566) (-0.630) (-1.016) (-0.959) (-1.703)        (0.712)       
          
R-squared  0.36 0.36 0.60 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.71 
obs  162  162  160  134  121  121  121     115    
F-test  30.67 7.67  19.77 37.03 22.06 22.96 10.35 24.73 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Equations are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. *,** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2  














Democracy 1.116*** 1.882*** 0.189  0.729  1.665*** -0.407* 
  (3.228) (3.498) (0.515) (1.049) (4.115) (-1.681)       
GDPcap  0.543*** 0.701*** 0.064  0.866*** 0.543**  -0.012       
  (3.129) (2.859) (0.362) (2.986) (2.410) (-0.112)       
gov  -0.019**  0.020 0.003 0.011 -0.107***  -0.004       
  (-2.115)  (1.637) (0.428) (0.813) (-5.746)  (-0.631)       
openness  -0.002  -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.002  0.004  -0.001       
  (-1.592) (-3.180) (-3.893) (-0.958) (1.149)  (-0.664)       
IMF  -0.339*** -0.848*** -0.122  -0.027  -0.361***  -0.064    
  (-2.824) (-4.184) (-0.663) (-0.110) (-2.584) (-0.444)       
CBI  0.093 -0.217  0.340 0.560 -0.313  0.641*** 
  (0.239) (-0.498)  (1.198) (0.549) (-0.746)  (3.150)       
proportional  0.090  -0.057 -0.013 0.219  0.213**  0.152* 
  (0.983) (-0.318)  (-0.114)  (1.368) (2.126) (1.689)       
presidential  -0.171 -0.541**  0.104  -0.181 -0.067 0.088       
  (-1.264) (-2.264) (0.893)  (-0.941) (-0.397) (0.564)       
military  -0.590*** -0.884*** -0.408*  -0.843*** -0.225  0.207       
  (-3.290) (-2.536) (-1.653) (-3.078) (-1.095) (1.245)       
Ineq  -0.026** -0.028*  -0.029** -0.057*  0.010  0.027*** 
  (-1.976) (-1.749) (-3.240) (-1.680) (0.680)  (3.397)       
latin  0.572*** 1.055*** 0.125  1.137*** -0.029  -0.640*** 
  (2.936) (3.289) (0.692) (4.015) (-0.125)  (-3.317)       
seasia  1.406*** 1.805*** 1.305*** 2.102*** 0.410  0.421*** 
  (5.098) (3.577) (6.592) (6.522) (1.483) (3.179)       
saharan 0.262 0.366 0.299 -0.076  0.457 -0.895*** 
  (1.073) (1.005) (1.488) (-0.157)  (1.341) (-4.060)       
transition  -0.195 0.565  -0.436 -0.673 -0.238 0.117       
  (-1.016) (1.800)  (-1.939) (-1.847) (-0.825) (0.753)       
        
R-squared  0.69 0.53 0.60 0.42 0.77 0.50 
obs  121 121 121 121 121 121       
F-test  22.06 4.58  11.41 7.75  25.69 10.69 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Equations are estimated using OLS with 
robust standard errors. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3  
Sensitivity analysis 
















Democracy 1.058*** 0.927**  1.388*** 1.108***  0.587*  1.521*** 1.504***  1.243*** 
  (5.412) (2.267) (3.479)  (3.198)  (1.736)  (4.608)  (3.074)  (3.087)    
GDPcap 0.616***  0.456**  0.579**  0.547***  0.346**  0.763***  0.626***  0.616*** 
  (6.122) (2.400) (2.158)  (3.051)  (2.210)  (5.342)  (4.159)  (2.725)    
gov  -0.016*** -0.024** -0.018* -0.018**  -0.017** -0.027*** -0.017**  -0.010       
  (-2.902) (-2.458) (-1.917)  (-2.114)  (-2.164) (-3.427) (-2.161)  (-1.090)       
openness -0.001 -0.002 -0.002  -0.002  0.000  -0.001 -0.002** -0.002       
  (-1.740) (-1.616) (-1.621)  (-1.598)  (0.173)  (-0.934) (-2.157)  (-1.489)       
IMF -0.260*** -0.406***  -0.376*  -0.338***  -0.177  -0.398*** -0.359**  -0.631*** 
  (-3.081) (-2.925) (-1.869)  (-2.804)  (-1.266) (-3.194) (-2.286)  (-2.627)       
CBI  -0.069  0.183  0.074  0.094  0.224  0.257  0.049  0.175    
  (-0.429)  (0.446) (0.158)  (0.243)  (0.565) (0.719) (0.167)  (0.410)       
proportional 0.024  0.062  0.103  0.091  -0.030  0.349***  0.099  0.079    
  (0.346) (0.611) (0.987)  (0.993)  (-0.315)  (3.930)  (0.946)  (0.817)    
presidential  0.059 -0.260  -0.184  -0.172  0.005 -0.378*** -0.159  -0.321** 
  (0.766) (-1.521)  (-1.226)  (-1.272)  (0.049) (-3.350)  (-1.131)  (-2.295)       
military -0.508*** -0.512***  -0.564** -0.591***  -0.502**  -0.955*** -0.607***  -0.675** 
  (-5.197) (-2.834) (-2.456)  (-3.290)  (-2.492) (-5.267) (-3.281)  (-1.999)       
Ineq -0.019*** -0.035**  -0.021  -0.026**  -0.025*  -0.004  -0.020  -0.017       
  (-3.147) (-2.115) (-1.481)  (-1.981)  (-1.763) (-0.275) (-1.567)  (-0.949)       
latin  0.435*** 0.715***   0.572***  0.216  0.312  0.597***  0.728*** 
  (3.810) (3.259)   (2.943)  (1.340) (1.460) (3.467)  (3.054)       
seasia  0.986*** 1.459*** 1.427*** 1.405***    1.837*** 1.438***  1.836*** 
  (7.310) (5.202) (5.170)  (5.112)    (7.648)  (8.357)  (6.547)    
saharan  0.022  0.428  0.343    -0.021  -0.992*** 0.339  0.273    
  (0.156)  (1.548)  (1.153)    (-0.084)  (-3.213)  (1.065)  (1.040)    
transition  -0.301***   -0.112  -0.196  -0.537*** 0.312  -0.126  0.215    
  (-3.033)    (-0.514)  (-1.022)  (-3.018)  (1.409)  (-0.545)  (0.700)    
europe            -1.679***                  
            (-5.289)                   
america            -1.052***                  
            (-3.165)                   
asia            -1.681***                  
            (-5.178)                   
             
R-squared  0.79 0.68 0.70  0.68  0.59 0.77 0.68  0.72 
obs  108 112 98 118  108 121 120  103       
F-test  29.15 23.47 24.75  11.45  24.85 16.04 12.72  28.08 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Equations are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors except 
from equation (7) where an instrumental variables regression method is used. *,** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 4  
Relative public to private sector efficiency 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
   Public sector  Private sector Relative 
Democracy 1.116***  -0.175**  2.763*** 
  (3.228)  (-2.015)  (5.102)    
GDPcap 0.543*** -0.163***  1.474*** 
  (3.129)  (-4.251)  (6.199)    
gov  -0.019**  -0.000  -0.015    
  (-2.115)  (-0.125)  (-1.033)    
openness -0.002  0.002*** -0.012*** 
  (-1.592)  (6.101)  (-5.635)    
IMF -0.339***  0.052  -0.625** 
  (-2.824)  (1.141)  (-2.189)    
CBI  0.093  -0.100  0.281    
  (0.239)  (-1.172)  (0.528)    
proportional  0.090  0.041  -0.050    
  (0.983)  (1.333)  (-0.262)    
presidential  -0.171  0.009  -0.305    
  (-1.264)  (0.233)  (-1.204)    
military -0.590***  0.154***  -1.459*** 
  (-3.290)  (2.832)  (-4.326)    
Ineq -0.026**  -0.001  -0.038* 
  (-1.976)  (-0.214)  (-1.776)    
latin 0.572***  -0.057  1.182*** 
  (2.936)  (-1.144)  (3.788)    
seasia 1.406***  -0.170***  3.112*** 
  (5.098)  (-3.436)  (10.110)    
saharan  0.262  -0.017  0.500    
  (1.073)  (-0.193)  (0.890)    
transition  -0.195  -0.070  -0.016    
  (-1.016)  (-1.084)  (-0.039)    
     
R-squared 0.69  0.48  0.73 
obs  121  121  121    
F-test 22.06  5.60  16.23 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Equations are 
estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. *,** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 5  
Regime type and PSE 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   Full sample  Democracies Autocracies  Full sample Democracies  Autocracies 
Democracy 1.116***  4.354***  1.074** 1.136**  5.129***  1.304** 
 (3.228)  (5.041)  (2.519)  (2.433) (3.963)  (2.102) 
Internal_conf       -0.003  -0.056  -0.028 
       (-0.112)  (-1.181)  (-0.500) 
GDPcap 0.543***  0.625***  0.443  0.548***  0.775***  0.502* 
 (3.129)  (2.717)  (1.870)  (2.877) (3.311)  (1.746) 
gov -0.019**  -0.036***  -0.006  -0.019**  -0.039***  -0.006 
 (-2.115)  (-4.046)  (-0.449)  (-2.078)  (-4.189)  (-0.409) 
openness -0.002  -0.000  -0.003  -0.002  -0.000  -0.003 
 (-1.592)  (-0.233)  (-0.821)  (-1.561)  (-0.360)  (-0.674) 
IMF -0.339***  -0.922***  -0.284  -0.345**  -1.076***  -0.349 
 (-2.824)  (-3.147)  (-1.540)  (-2.483)  (-3.033)  (-1.627) 
CBI 0.093  0.731*  -0.339  0.086  0.738*  -0.509 
 (0.239)  (1.691)  (-0.530)  (0.216)  (1.698)  (-0.658) 
proportional 0.090  -0.014  0.125  0.090  0.012  0.098 
 (0.983)  (-0.136)  (0.833) (0.971)  (0.114)  (0.544) 
presidential -0.171  0.064  0.036  -0.170  0.016  0.075 
 (-1.264)  (0.437)  (0.223)  (-1.236) (0.104)  (0.434) 
military -0.590***    -0.501**  -0.598***    -0.593* 
 (-3.290)    (-2.210)  (-2.944)    (-1.925) 
Ineq -0.026**  -0.031**  -0.022*  -0.026**  -0.032**  -0.023* 
 (-1.976)  (-2.019)  (-1.690)  (-2.011)  (-2.052)  (-1.721) 
latin 0.572***  0.541*  0.185  0.573***  0.675**  0.161 
 (2.936)  (1.945)  (0.980)  (2.909) (2.109)  (0.772) 
seasia 1.406***  2.522***  0.692***  1.407***  2.480***  0.663** 
 (5.098)  (14.012)  (2.735)  (5.061)  (12.830)  (2.550) 
saharan 0.262  0.835**  -0.367  0.258  1.029**  -0.471 
 (1.073)  (2.220)  (-1.140)  (1.081)  (2.511)  (-1.179) 
transition -0.195  -0.369  -0.491 -0.187  -0.216  -0.461 
 (-1.016)  (-1.594)  (-1.831)  (-0.821)  (-0.841)  (-1.603) 
            
R-squared 0.69  0.85  0.72  0.69  0.85  0.72 
obs 121  80  41  121  80 41 
F-test 22.06  24.56  8.97  20.83  24.56  9.07 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Equations are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. *,** 
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Appendix A. Electoral rule and equilibrium 
Since we are interested in a sub-game perfect equilibrium, we solve the model backwards 
beginning from the second period. In the second period there are no re-election incentives to 
restrain the policy maker and, thus, his optimal strategy is to extract the maximum amount of S2. 
This is achieved by choosing to tax the whole income of the voters (i.e. τ2=w), not to produce the 
public good (i.e. G2=0) and extract the maximum amount of slack, i.e. S2=w.  
At the beginning of the first period, when voters announce and commit to their voting rule, 
they take into account the policy-maker’s second stage optimal strategy. Denote as ε the cut-off 
utility level, such that if  1 u ε ≥ , the voters re-elect the incumbent (i.e. Φ=1). Since the incumbent 
can always extract the maximum amount of rents in the first period (i.e. choose S1=w) and forego 
re-election, the voters must offer an incentive to prevent him from doing so, amd therefore 
minimize the amount of slack. Thus, there is a level of “permissible” rents, which satisfies the 
following relationship: 
1 (1 ) Sw w w δ δσ +≥ +−                 ( A . 1 )  
The left hand side of (A.1) corresponds to the utility of the policy maker when he extracts a 
level of “permissible” rents (S1) in the first period. In this case, the policy maker has probability 
1  to  win the elections and remain in office in the second period, when he will extract the 
maximum amount of rents (S2=w). The right hand side of (A.1) corresponds to the policy 
maker’s utility if he extracts the maximum amount of rents in the first period (S1=w) and lose the 
elections therefrom. In this case, staying in office in the second period depends solely on the 
degree of “autocracy” (i.e. the term (1-σ)).  




           if       (1 )







              (A.2) 
where  { }
*
11 1 1 1 max ; . .   SS c G s t u τ ε == − ≥ . 
Clearly the voters are better off if the policy maker chooses 
*
1 S  instead of w. Moreover, since the 
electorate’s utility is increasing in G1 and decreasing in τ1, they will choose the voting rule that 
leads the policy maker to decide S1 so that that satisfies (A.1) holds with equality. The above 











                ( A . 3 )  
which gives τ1, G1, S1 and ε as:  
 
1
1 () G GHc
− =                  ( A . 4 )  
1
1 (1 ) ( ) G wc H c τσ δ
− =− −                 ( A . 5 )  
1 (1 ) Sw σδ =−                  ( A . 6 )  
1 (( ) ) G wH H c εσ δ
− =+                 ( A . 7 )  
 
Then in the first period, the policy maker decides G1 and τ1 so that (A.1) holds with equality and 






   34
Appendix B. Public sector efficiency indicators: Formulation and sources  
 
In this appendix we elaborate on the construction of the PSE indicators as in Angelopoulos 
and Philippopoulos (2005). The performance and expenditure measures used to construct the 
PSE indicators for each policy area are provided in the Table below.  
 
Public sector efficiency indicators 
 





Inverse of corruption in government and bureaucratic 
quality (ICRG, 2000) 
Average public spending in goods 
and services (World Bank, 2004) 
Infrastructure 
(PSEinfr) 
Diesel locomotives in use (% of total locomotives) 
and the inverse of average electric power 
transmission and distribution losses (World Bank, 
2004) 
Total government expenditure as % 










Unemployment, GDP per capita (PPP), GDP growth 
(World Bank, 2004) 
Total government expenditure as % 




Inflation rate and GDP growth variability (World 
Bank, 2004) 
 
Total government expenditure as % 
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Appendix C. Data Descriptions and Sources 
 
 
Notation Description  Sources 
Democracy  Gastil democracy index, which consists of two 
components, civil liberties and political rights  Freedom House (2004) 
Democracy polity  Polity democracy index  Polity IV (2004) database 
Democracy 
Przeworski  Przeworski democracy index  Przeworski et al. (2000) 
GDPcap  GDP per capita  Penn World Tables (2000) 
gov  Government spending (%GDP)  Penn World Tables (2000) 
openness  Imports plus exports (%GDP)  Penn World Tables (2000) 
IMF  Dummy variable taking the value 1 whenever a 
country is under an IMF program  Joyce (2006) 
CBI 
Cukierman et al. (1992) index of Central Bank 
Independence, as updated by Polillo and Guillén 
(2005) 
Polillo and Guillén (2005) 
proportional  Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the electoral 
rule is proportional and 0 if it is majoritarian  Beck et al. (2001) 
presidential  Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the system is 
presidential and 0 if it is parliamentary  Beck et al. (2001) 
presidential_age  Presidential dummy multiplied to the Age of 
Democracy.  
Own calculations based on Beck et 
al. (2001) and Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) 
age  (2000-first year of positive POLITY IV variable)/200  Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
military  Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the chief 
executive of the government is a military officer  Beck et al. (2001) 
Ineq  Household income inequality 





Political violence in the country. The risk rating 
assigned is the sum of three sub-components (Civil 
War/Coup Threat, Terrorism/Political Violence, Civil 
Disorder) 
International Country Risk Guide 
(2006) 
 
 
 